

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		<b>SECRET</b>	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr. Angleton		5/9/57
2			
3	<i>Ek file</i>		
4	<i>clerk</i>		
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p>Jim: This is all we can find in our file on the subject you called me about. Kindly see that it is returned to me after it has served your purpose.</p> <p>DOJ Review Completed</p> <p><i>Thanks</i></p>			
FOLD HERE			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
EA/DCI		5 Mar 57	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		<b>SECRET</b>	

FORM NO. 1 APR 55

237

Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 O-34253

UNCLASSIFIED      RESTRICTED <span style="background-color: black; color: black;">CONFIDENTIAL</span> SECRET	
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP	
TO	
1	DDCI
2	ER (File)
3	
4	DOJ Review Completed
5	
FROM	
1	EO/DD/P
2	DDCI
3	

  

INITIALS	DATE
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>	5/14/52
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>	25X1
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>	7 May

  

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

  

REMARKS:

DD/P asked that the attached copy be forwarded for your information

  

SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	UNCLASSIFIED
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Executive Registry

2-8622

Noted by D/OCI

5/14/52 dt

MAY 2 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries.

1. The FBI maintains representatives at ten foreign posts; with more than one man assigned in some cases. (TAB A) Additional representatives have been assigned to already established and new posts within the past months. Further expansion of this coverage apparently is contemplated. CIA has not been advised of new or additional assignments by the FBI, and has been given minimum information upon query as to duties and relations with CIA personnel in the area. (TABS B, C)
2. The authority by which the FBI maintains representatives abroad and a definition of their responsibilities have repeatedly been sought by CIA without avail. Discreet inquiry to the State Department has disclosed a similar ignorance on the part of that department. The FBI, through its liaison officer, has stated that its representatives conduct liaison with foreign governments on police matters, espionage, and Communist affairs affecting the internal security of the United States, and of concern only to the FBI. The meaning, particularly of the last phrase, remains unclarified. In practice, it appears to be interpreted as authority to conduct liaison on any subject with foreign intelligence services and, if occasioned, to participate in intelligence operations. No case is known of a foreign service being referred to CIA by an FBI attache on the grounds that the matter under consideration was not within FBI competence. The legal attaches do not restrict their contacts to police or internal security services, or their activities to the countries to which they ostensibly are assigned. (TAB D)
3. The foreign services, uninformed as to the respective official responsibilities of CIA and the FBI, at best are confused and, at worst, are in a position to play one U.S. service against another. In keeping with traditional intelligence liaison practice, they must be expected to exploit this opportunity. Professional jealousies between the services of a foreign country are often encountered. To conduct liaison advantageously under these circumstances requires tact and diplomatic handling. For more than one

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U.S. service to undertake this liaison creates an immediate danger of either or both foreign services being affronted. There is, in addition, an annoyance to foreign services brought about by being approached by two U.S. services on the same or similar subjects.

4. Foreign services repeatedly seek information on affairs extending into the U.S. That such information can be obtained through CIA is expected, both as a matter of routine liaison and as one of return for information provided or activities conducted for CIA. In the past, CIA has been unable to comply with requests because of the FBI reluctance to release data through CIA to foreign services. If the foreign service is in a position to turn directly to an FBI attache rather than use CIA as an unsatisfactory channel, it may be expected to do so, to the obvious future disregard of CIA.

5. During the past several months, serious efforts have been made to avoid duplication by the CIA stations and FBI representatives, and to insure coordination at Washington and in the field. Some progress in this has been noted. The difficulties, real and potential, outlined above remain unsolved, however. They will continue so long as FBI attaches with undefined responsibilities constitute a second U.S. intelligence service in the foreign field.

6. It is my opinion that relations between CIA and the FBI have improved since the Directors met and discussed mutual problems at luncheon, and since the inauguration of the regular monthly meetings. It is recommended that the following action be taken: That I press for a definite statement of functions of legal attaches at the next monthly meeting, and if no satisfactory statement is forthcoming, that I take the matter personally to Mr. Hoover. If results cannot be obtained in the above fashion, I would then recommend that the DCI intervene.

CONCUR:

Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosures.

/s/ Lyman Kirkpatrick

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK  
Assistant Director  
Special Operations

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On or about 28 March 1952, the FBI liaison representative, Mr. S. J. Papich, stated that his previous assignment had been as headquarters' supervisor for foreign representatives of the FBI. As such he was familiar with their identities, duties, and assigned cases, as well as with FBI views as to their role. He stated that there was no intention to add to their number or to expand the area of their coverage. He further stated that he felt it would be highly desirable for CIA to brief any new FBI man going to the field. He stated that the FBI had a definite need for foreign representatives to handle with local services the foreign aspects of U.S. internal security cases. He stated that it was his guess that CIA would some day take over all the Legal Attaches. He felt that such action would be unfortunate, because the Legal Attaches have been able to get much faster service from the various foreign services than has CIA acting on behalf of the FBI.

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At the 11 March 1952 meeting of CIA and FBI, the FBI charged a CIA station with the "deliberate withholding of information" from the FBI Legal Attache.

CIA replied by stating that it was apparent that neither the station nor CIA was clear as to the sphere of interest of the Legal Attache. CIA did know of the FBI's general responsibilities and interests with regard to internal security, but was not clear as to other interests. The FBI replied that its "interests are limitless". It is only its operations which are closely limited.

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